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The purpose of this research is to develop a more comprehensive energy 
investment decision model that includes intangible factors related to risk and resiliency. 
Additionally, this project evaluates the current Department of the Navy energy 
investment model and pinpoints how gaps and shortfalls lead to increased exposure to 
avoidable energy risk. The project selects the relevant risk and resiliency factors for 
inclusion, and then quantifies them as inputs for a new decision making model. The 
model developed for this project includes cost metrics and policy mandates that the 
current model considers and adds the intangible factors related to risk and resiliency. To 
validate the model, the Bloom Box Energy Server is evaluated under the status quo and 
then again under the new model, with risk and resiliency playing a larger role in the 
outcome. The results show that under the status quo, the Bloom Box is a poor energy 
investment; however, when evaluated under the new model, the Bloom Box is a more 
attractive investment due to the energy security and independence it provides. The 
different outcomes show that energy risk and resiliency factors affect energy decisions. 
This project then recommends follow-on research options to further develop and validate 
the model. 
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The Department of Defense views low total ownership cost as the number one 
priority during the energy investment process. In today’s fiscally constrained 
environment, costs cannot be ignored; however, Secretary of the Navy Ray Mabus’ goals 
of energy security and independence are unattainable without considering the full breadth 
of energy decision variables. The energy return on investment tool (eROI), serves as the 
status quo for energy investments. While eROI provides a framework for making energy 
decisions, the tool is flawed because it does not include the intangible and qualitative 
metrics of energy risk and resiliency. Cost metrics account for 39% of the decision for an 
energy project, while risk factors such as the price volatility of fossil fuels, grid overload 
probability, vulnerability of substations to domestic terrorist attacks, and the effect 
natural disasters have on fossil fuel production and distribution do not receive 
consideration. This neglect leaves naval installations vulnerable to avoidable risk and 
further weakens the resiliency of an energy infrastructure. Cost metrics cannot serve as 
the only deciding factors for energy projects because they do not contribute to energy 
security and independence. 
The literature consistently notes that energy risk and resiliency significantly 
impact the effectiveness of energy projects—particularly energy generation. 
Incorporating risk and resiliency into energy decision making is challenging because 
capturing and quantifying intangible risk factors is difficult and subjective. However, 
relevant literature concludes that consideration of risk and resiliency will affect decision 
making by allowing leaders to make more informed and comprehensive decisions, 
potentially leading to different conclusions regarding energy project selection.  
For this project, we used Multiple Attribute Utility Theory (MAUT) to develop an 
energy decision-making model that identifies and quantifies risk and resiliency factors. In 
contrast to the status quo model, eROI, the new model organizes energy considerations 
into four equally weighted categories: cost, risk, resiliency, and policy, all weighted at 
25% each. The model provides a framework that accounts for quantitative data such as 
cost and savings over time, and qualitative data such as price volatility of fossil fuels and 
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the storage ability of an energy project. The model is flexible and easily adaptable by 
modifying the weights of each category based on perceived value as well as adding and 
subtracting attributes of each category. Ultimately, the new model is a more 
comprehensive tool than the status quo. 
To validate the new model, we collected and analyzed data on an alternative 
energy generation project known as the Bloom Box. The Bloom Box provides reliable 
power independent of the commercial grid, which ultimately increases energy security 
through reduced risk and increased resiliency. We analyzed the Bloom Box under the 
current energy investment tool, eROI, and then again with the energy decision model 
developed for this project.  
Under eROI, we found that the Bloom Box receives a very low overall score 
because the net present value (NPV) over the ten-year expected life span is -$600,135, 
with a payback period of over 37 years. Based on this metric alone, the Bloom Box 
would never receive consideration as a viable project because eROI places such a high 
emphasis on cost. However, when evaluated using different metrics under the new model, 
Bloom Box is found to provide naval installations with a significant increase in energy 
reliability, security, and independence. This gain toward a secure energy infrastructure 
would never be realized using eROI because the project would be dismissed immediately 
after evaluating the financial metrics. 
Continued research is necessary to further develop and validate the model. We 
recommend that data be collected on energy generation projects to evaluate under the 
new model and eROI. We hypothesize that the outcome differences between the same 
project using two different models will further prove that risk and resiliency affect 
decision making when weighted similarly to cost metrics.  
We conclude that today’s energy investment process lacks the inclusion of risk 
and resiliency factors necessary to provide energy security and independence. While cost 
metrics such as NPV cannot be ignored as the DOD adjusts to constrained budgets, the 
overreliance on an unstable commercial grid leaves shore installations with too much 
risk. The question for energy planners and leaders is this: What is an acceptable level of 
 xix 
risk? Since current energy decisions are not inclusive of a full scope of risk, that question 
remains unanswered. If cost must remain the primary consideration moving forward, then 
the question becomes: How much cost savings must a project generate to accept a higher 
level of risk and lower level of resiliency? 
The implied objective of the model is not necessarily to show that considering the 
full scope of risk and resiliency will always lead to a different decision, but rather to 
illustrate that under certain conditions the outcome will be different. A project scores 
differently when the perceived value of cost, risk, resiliency, and policy vary. 
The Navy perceives eROI as a comprehensive tool for energy investments, but the 
model omits important factors of risk and resiliency, thus exposing shore installations to 
increased risk. Today, energy security is at the mercy of the national power grid. Partially 
to blame for this flaw is an overemphasis on cost metrics and an undervaluation of risk 
and resiliency. The new model developed for this project improves upon the status quo 
and places the Navy closer to Secretary Mabus’ goals of energy security and 
independence.  
 xx 





The Department of the Navy’s (DON) strategy for energy security directs shore 
installations to invest in renewable energy so that they become less reliant on the aging 
and vulnerable commercial grid (Department of the Navy, 2012). Therefore, installations 
must re-evaluate their energy infrastructure in order to meet strategic goals outlined by 
the president and Congress in a fiscally responsible manner. Naval installations have a 
strong dependence on energy supply and the smooth continuity of its delivery. Power 
plants and energy distribution stations are becoming larger and more complex as 
installation size and demand grow, requiring a real time balance for supply to meet 
demands. Computer systems governing the normal functionality and mission critical 
operations of installations rely directly on this continuous energy supply.   
The current Department of Defense (DOD) energy acquisition and investment 
strategy prioritizes low total ownership costs (TOC), providing reliable energy to critical 
infrastructure, maintaining compliance with federal law and policy, and minimizing 
consumption. While these factors are certainly critical to providing secure energy and a 
reliable infrastructure, the list is not comprehensive. Two major considerations are 
overlooked: energy risk and energy resiliency. While risk and resiliency may receive 
discussion and consideration during an energy project evaluation, they are not prioritized 
appropriately, if at all.  
Energy investment decision making fails to incorporate intangible risk factors 
such as the price volatility of fossil fuels, grid overload probability, vulnerability of 
substations to domestic terrorist attacks, and the effect natural disasters have on fossil 
fuel production and distribution. Additionally, resiliency factors, such as localized 
generation, energy conservation, and the ability to prioritize power distribution, are 
lacking from the current energy investment decision process. This neglect leaves 
installations vulnerable to mission failure through increased exposure to risks, thereby 
reducing their ability to provide secure and reliable energy. Incorporating risk and 
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resiliency factors into energy project evaluations is necessary in order to make 
comprehensive energy investment decisions. 
B. OBJECTIVE 
The purpose of this research is to develop a more comprehensive energy 
investment decision model that includes intangible factors related to risk and resiliency 
along with traditional considerations such as cost metrics and policy mandates. 
Furthermore, this project identifies how gaps and shortfalls in the current DON energy 
investment model lead to increased exposure to avoidable energy risk. The end state of 
this project is a functional model that energy planners can utilize to improve energy 
infrastructure at shore installations through risk mitigation and improved resiliency. 
C. KEY TERMS 
To understand the concepts and methodology of this research, energy security, 
energy risk, energy resilience and energy independence are defined in the context of the 
DOD. 
Energy security for the DOD means having “assured access to reliable supplies 
of energy and the ability to protect and deliver sufficient energy to meet operational 
needs” (Assistant Secretary of Defense for Operational Energy Plans and Programs, n.d.). 
This definition does not mention risk or resiliency; however, throughout this paper, 
energy security is used as a term inclusive of energy risk and energy resiliency. 
We found no standard definition for energy risk; however, literature generally 
refers to energy risk as a function of energy security. The lower the level of perceived 
energy security, the higher the risk, and vice-versa. The risk factors previously mentioned 
in the problem statement are not all-inclusive, but they are a critical component in 
understanding our interpretation of energy risk and the “all-in” cost of installation energy.  
The definition of energy resilience varies slightly among organizations due to the 
complexity and scope of what the organization aims to accomplish. The Office of the 
Assistant Secretary of Defense, Energy, Installations and Environment (OASD[EI&E]) 
(n.d.) defines DOD energy resilience as “the ability to prepare for and recover from 
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energy disruptions that impact mission assurance on military installations.” The 
definition provides this research with a broad foundation of what energy resilience within 
the DOD should encompass, leaving much room for interpretation. With the subjectivity 
of this definition, an unlimited number of dynamic factors may be included when 
determining what makes an installation’s energy infrastructure resilient, creating 
complexity when pinpointing the value of components in terms of resiliency. 
According to the DON (2010), “energy independence is achieved when naval 
forces can rely only on energy resources that are not subject to intentional or accidental 
supply disruptions. As a priority, energy independence increases operational 
effectiveness by making naval forces more energy self-sufficient and less dependent on 
vulnerable energy production and supply lines.”  
D. NATURAL DISASTERS 
“DOD installations in the United States rely on the commercial electricity grid for 
99 percent of their electricity needs” (Samaras & Willis, 2013, p. iii). In other words, 
installations assume all the risk associated with the inability to conduct missions during a 
commercial gird outage. Yet, DOD policy does not consider many important risk factors, 
such as probability of natural disasters, when making energy investments. During a 
disaster of any magnitude, shore installations often serve as a central hub in coordinating 
recovery efforts, rescue missions and providing medical relief, requiring them to be more 
resilient than any other customer reliant on the commercial grid. Natural disasters pose a 
significant threat to a shore installation’s ability to carry out that mission as critical 
weaknesses of the grid are exposed. 
The Great East Japanese Earthquake (GEJE) of 2011 is evidence of the 
devastation that natural disasters have on an energy infrastructure. Approximately 
7.4 million homes were without power, and the Tohoko and Tokyo electric companies 
were still unable to produce 27 GW of power a full 10 days after the disaster (Inajima & 
Okada, 2011). Months later, during the peak of summer, the two companies announced 
that electricity supply would fall short of norms by 7 to 10 percent. Lacking a formal 
energy disaster plan, the Japanese government response was reactionary. Rolling 
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blackouts and reduction mandates for homes and businesses were implemented for the 
next several months as power was restored (Kimura & Ken-ichiro, 2013). 
Additionally, the Yokosuna Naval Base and Misawa Air Base, home to two 
squadrons of F-16 fighter jets, lost electricity and telecommunications capabilities 
(Military Personnel, 2011). Four full days after the GEJE only minimal power was 
restored, leaving installations struggling to execute critical missions and humanitarian aid 
efforts to the population. More importantly, however, is the installation’s exposure to risk 
of operational failure and an inability to respond to a deliberate attack. 
The GEJE reveals vulnerabilities in the energy infrastructure and further stresses a 
need to incorporate risk factors and resiliency metrics into energy investments. The 
probability of natural disaster occurrence in a specific region along with the assessed 
range of damaging effects is not considered when evaluating an energy project. A 
decision model that incorporates these considerations mitigates unnecessary risk at shore 
installations and further evaluates an energy project beyond the scope of just costs. 
E. INTELLIGENT ADVERSARY  
The possibility of hostile attacks within the United States requires increased 
security to protect domestic energy grids and infrastructure that are vital to civilian 
infrastructure and DOD installations. Unlike natural disasters, an adversary can adapt its 
plan of attack to maximize effects on the identified vulnerabilities. Therefore, risks 
associated with natural disasters and deliberate attacks differ and should be evaluated 
independently of one another. Additionally, an intelligent adversary’s potential targets 
and goals vary, making the risk for negative impacts on energy infrastructure and society 
difficult to predict and defend against.  
According to the Incident Review Center SST (2014), California’s Metcalf 
Substation, which supplies power to most of central California’s Silicon Valley, lost 
power for four hours when attackers fired assault rifles, destroying 17 of 19 transformers. 
The same study indicated that the security response was slow, allowing time for the 
attackers to fire over 100 rounds of 7.62mm ammunition, causing more than $15 million 
in damages. The Incident Review Center further stated that power was rerouted, 
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eventually, and prolonged blackouts were avoided. However, due to the limited 
availability of parts, and the range of damage, repair crews needed approximately four 
weeks to return the substation to full capacity. 
This single attack raised awareness to the vulnerabilities and lack of resiliency in 
energy infrastructure. From a macro perspective, the total damage from the attack was 
minimal: a 20-minute attack that caused $15 million in damage and took four weeks to 
repair (Incident Review Center SST, Inc., 2014). The most valuable lesson, however, is 
the potential for disaster and the damage that could have been caused if a similar attack 
were executed on a larger scale with more coordination and firepower. Fortunately, grid 
monitors restored power within four hours after rerouting electricity but had this been a 
simultaneous attack on multiple substations, the technology capital of the world could 
have been without power for months. The economic impact of Silicon Valley without 
power for a prolonged period would have disastrous effects.  
A similar scenario is realistic for critical naval installations such as Naval Air 
Station Lemoore, home to all F/A-18 strike fighter squadrons on the west coast. If 
Lemoore were without power for a prolonged period, the squadrons would lack the 
ability to conduct missions. Training missions and peacetime operations are sacrificial, 
but what if Lemoore had no power during an actual domestic attack and the fighter 
squadrons were necessary for homeland defense? Without factoring in the potential for 
deliberate attacks to energy investments, the substations and infrastructure on DOD 
installations are exposed to unnecessary risk.  
The Incident Review Center SST estimates that 2,000 electrical transformers 
throughout the U.S. provide power to three main hubs that feed and distribute power to 
the entire country. After the Metcalf incident, investigations concluded that most 
substations are extremely vulnerable to attack due to their remote locations and lack of 
resiliency (Incident Review Center SST, Inc., 2014). While most critical energy 
infrastructures have backup generation, they are designed to provide power for just a few 
days. Yet, substations and other energy generation systems require months to replace 
critical components such as transformers. DOD installations rely too heavily on short 
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term and unreliable back up power generation methods and are unprepared to conduct 
operations during an outage that lasts longer than just a few days. 
Since current energy investment decisions over-prioritize costs and under-
prioritize risk and resiliency, a new decision-making model is necessary that redistributes 
the amount of weight placed on each decision factor. A forward thinking and farsighted 
approach must occur during the procurement and investment stages of energy projects to 
mitigate the risks and potentially disastrous consequences associated with an intelligent 
adversary attack  
F. DOD AND DON ENERGY GOALS AND OBJECTIVES 
The DOD measures progress toward energy goals against the following: 
• The Energy Independence and Security Act (EISA) of 2007 
• Executive Order 13423 and 3514 
• Energy Policy Act of 2005 
• Title 10 U.S.C. 2911(e) 
Table 1 defines each goal and shows each service’s progress as of FY 2014. 
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Table 1.   FY 2014 DOD Progress toward Facility Energy and Water Goals 
 
Source: Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Energy, Installations, and 
Environment). (2015). Department of Defense annual energy ,management report: Fiscal 
year 2014.Washington, DC. Author. 
All the goals and objectives identified in Table 1 are centered on reducing 
demand and consumption and moving toward renewable sources. Omitted is any 
language regarding risk and resiliency. While reducing demand and increasing renewable 
sources does lower energy risk through less reliance on the commercial grid, the DOD 
energy strategy and measurement criteria does not appropriately prioritize a risk averse 
and resilient energy infrastructure for installations.  
In addition to the DOD standard, the DON has established a more aggressive and 
demanding set of goals. In 2009, Secretary of the Navy (SECNAV) Ray Mabus made 
security and independence the top energy priorities for the DON, which also aligns with 
the president’s energy goals. The goals and associated benchmarks for the DON are as 
follows:  
1. Increase alternative energy use DON-Wide. By 2020, 50% of total DON 
energy consumption will come from alternative sources.  
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2. Increase alternative energy ashore. By 2020, DON will produce at least 
50% of shore based energy requirements from alternative sources; 50% of 
DON installations will be net-zero.  
3. Reduce Non-tactical petroleum use. By 2015, DON will reduce petroleum 
use in the commercial vehicle fleet by 50%.  
4. Sail the “Great Green Fleet.” DON will demonstrate a Green Strike Group 
in local operations by 2012 and sail it by 2016.  
5. Energy efficient acquisition. Evaluation of energy factors will be 
mandatory when awarding contracts for systems and buildings 
(Department of the Navy, 2012, p. 3). 
Similarly to the DOD’s goals and objectives, the DON does not mention risk or 
resiliency in their energy strategy. We found no information later than 2010 showing the 
DON’s progression toward their internal standard. This suggests that progress is not 
tracked and reported as closely and carefully as the DOD’s goals and objectives. 
G. ENERGY RETURN ON INVESTMENT 
When evaluating energy infrastructure investments, the Navy Installations 
Command (CNIC) developed an eROI (energy return on investment) template to make 
decisions between energy projects for naval shore installations. The eROI tool is an Excel 
spreadsheet containing various questions and scoring scales that reflect a potential energy 
project’s characteristics. The intent of the eROI is to ensure that energy decision makers 
consider cost, risk, and capability metrics of the project, while incorporating the DOD 
and DON energy goals. The eROI tool is composed of five key strategic drivers that are 
individually scored and imply an imputed value of the project. All energy projects are 
evaluated using this system to ensure that the energy policy set forth by the DON is being 
met and that the Navy will see an adequate return on capital invested. The eROI tool 
currently serves as the status quo for how the Navy makes energy investments and 
decisions at shore installations. The eROI process is explained in detail in a later chapter. 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. EFFECTS OF NATURAL DISASTERS AND DOMESTIC TERROR ON 
ENERGY 
We reviewed three reports regarding energy disasters: two covering natural 
disasters and one from a direct attack on an energy grid. The critical link between such 
disasters and DOD is the installation. During an emergency, DOD installations 
commonly serve as the central hub in coordinating recovery efforts, rescue missions and 
providing medical relief. Therefore, DOD installations require the most resilient and 
reliable means of energy security in order to ensure mission success. 
1. Report on Hurricane Effects on Energy Supply 
In April 2013, The Office of Electricity Delivery and Energy Reliability and U.S. 
Department of Energy (DOE), published a report, Comparing the Impacts of Northeast 
Hurricanes on Energy Infrastructure. The reported compared the effects Hurricane Irene 
and Sandy had on energy infrastructure and energy supply. Both storms caused power 
outages to millions with average repair times consisting of five days for Irene and ten 
days for Sandy. The main consequences of the storms were a damaged energy 
infrastructure leading to the inability to transmit power from substation to substation, and 
distribute the power to customers. Additionally, the report noted that petroleum supply to 
the New York and surrounding metro areas was disrupted for several weeks following the 
storms due to extensive storm damage and power outages to refineries and marine receipt 
terminals. 
This report is useful to our research because it exposes weaknesses in energy 
infrastructure and further identifies a near-sighted approach with respect to repair 
priorities. For example, the focus of local governments and power companies was 
repairing the damaged infrastructure as fast as possible, taking a short-term approach. 
This approach fails to address the long-term vision necessary for a more resilient energy 
grid. Resiliency was not improved after the repairs to energy systems following 
Hurricane Irene, proven by similar and more extensive damage caused by Hurricane 
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Sandy. If utility companies and government agencies had employed a decision-making 
model that implemented risk factors, then their energy infrastructure would have likely 
been resilient enough to withstand future storms.  
This report fails to identify the full scope of energy resiliency. The petroleum 
shortage directly impacts energy resiliency through second and third order effects such as 
the unavailability of gasoline for the area, commerce disruptions, and logistics 
complications, which the report did not include. Resilient energy infrastructure extends 
beyond the installation’s energy gird and distribution capability to the people controlling 
the system and their ability to provide support, maintenance and technical expertise. 
The lessons learned from the hurricanes provide evidence that a diversified 
energy portfolio with multiple sources of renewable energy counters the effects of a 
disrupted petroleum supply chain. 
2. Report on Earthquake Effects on Energy Supply 
The report, How Two Microgrids Fared After the 2011 Earthquake, states that the 
Great East Japanese Earthquake and Tsunami (GEJE) interrupted 14 gigawatts of 
combined nuclear and thermal power generation used to service eastern Japan. As a 
result, the Tohoku Electric Power Company was unable to supply power to its customers; 
however, two microgrids successfully produced and distributed power after the GEJE, 
when the Tohoku megagrid failed. The Sendai Microgrid (SM) supplied power and 
distributed it to critical nodes during the GEJE aftermath due to its resilient design. SM 
resiliency resulted from its localized energy source in the form of a hardened natural gas 
supply infrastructure, along with the skill and improvisation of technicians (p. 54). 
Similarly, Roppongi Hills, another microgrid, had a localized natural gas 
infrastructure that fueled turbines without interruption providing centralized heat and 
power (CHP). The resiliency of SM and Roppongi proves that a localized energy source 
can act as a lifeline to generate power in the event of disaster. 
The authors note that for a grid to be truly resilient, it should have multiple 
methods of energy generation that can support each other when one method fails. For 
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example, Tokyo Gas is creating a secure energy system consisting of fuel cell CHP, 
natural gas gensets, solar thermal water heating, and standard boilers and chillers that will 
supply power to a business district in Tokyo (p. 57). This diversified energy portfolio 
incorporates a higher ratio of energy generation to load components, which reduces risk 
and increases resiliency. This is helpful for our research because diversification is an 
important risk factor to consider when making energy infrastructure decisions. However, 
further research is needed to identify additional risk factors.  
As a result of the GEJE, Japanese companies are now prioritizing energy 
resilience. In emergency situations, when power availability is limited, efficient 
consumption can reduce the stress on a grid leading to a more resilient infrastructure. The 
authors identified that “lowering energy consumption contributes to both emergency 
energy resilience and cost reduction in normal conditions” (p. 57). This point contributes 
to our research because efficient energy consumption leads to risk mitigation and 
increased resilience. 
A lesson learned from GEJE was that an energy contingency plan should include 
ranking and prioritizing critical nodes. Supplying energy to non-critical nodes during the 
aftermath of GEJE was counterproductive to supporting the core effort. Even if power 
can be generated, distribution to non-critical nodes degrades the effectiveness of the 
system. When power is limited over long periods of time, managing energy conservation 
becomes critical; therefore, a resilient energy system should have a predetermined 
distribution plan.  
A significant gap in this article that relates to our research is quantifying risk and 
resilience. The authors mention that resiliency increased, but how is it measured? How 
can leaders make claims about increased resiliency without having quantifiable metrics to 
measure and compare against? This begs the question, was resiliency actually increased 
in the examples provided?  
3. Report on Direct Assaults on Energy Supply 
The report, Mitigating Active Shooting Incidents and Sniper Attacks on the Bulk 
Power Grid, analyzes a deliberate assault on California’s Metcalf Substation and 
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highlights the vulnerability of the commercial power grid to physical attacks. The PG&E 
Substation supports the electrical needs for most of central California including the 
technology capital of the U.S., Silicon Valley. The report estimates that $15 million in 
damage was caused when individuals destroyed 17 transformers with rifles. The report 
further cites the unpreparedness of security forces allowed the attackers to fire over 100 
rounds of 7.62mm ammo in 19 minutes before police arrived on scene. Utility workers 
needed more than four weeks to bring the substation back to full capacity. 
The authors concluded that all substations’ security (not just Metcalf) are neither 
prepared nor equipped to detect or prevent future attacks given the current protocols. The 
attack did however alert energy security officials to the weaknesses of substations. As a 
result, changes to detection and prevention security technologies are progressing. 
PG&E published a summary of the Metcalf incident stating they will spend $100 
million over the next three years on Metcalf security upgrades (Pacific Gas and Electric 
Company, n.d). However, despite technology advancements that will presumably result, 
an energy system is no more secure or resilient from attack if the technology is 
reactionary and not preventative. True resiliency against deliberate attack results when an 
incident is detected before it actually occurs but the security effort seems to be focused 
on detection. 
This report is useful for our research because it shows us that shortfalls exist in 
the progression toward energy resiliency against intelligent adversaries. We can use the 
identified security gaps as risk factors and inputs for an energy investment decision-
making model. 
B. RISK 
The literature on risk regarding energy investments is consistent: DOD makes 
energy investments based on the lowest, up-front cost, neglecting life-cycle costs and 
comprehensive risk factors. Military installations are too dependent on a fragile 
commercial grid, which leaves them vulnerable to mission failure.  
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1. Monetizing Energy Security 
The Monetizing Energy Security white paper asserts that “DOD should closely 
consider the actual, all-in (i.e., levelized) cost of energy, beyond merely the delivered 
price per gallon or kw (kilowatt)” (p. 3). This levelized cost of energy includes the cost 
and risks associated with DOD’s current energy procurement process. The paper 
identifies such risks as 
• price volatility of natural gas and crude oil; 
• grid overload; 
• natural disasters and their effect on oil and gas production and 
distribution; 
• sabotage; 
• interruptions in fuel supplies to generating plants; 
• dependence on a fragile and vulnerable commercial power grid, placing 
critical military and Homeland defense missions at unacceptable risk of 
extended outages; and 
• terrorist attacks, physical and cyber. (pp. 3–6) 
Since DOD does not account for these factors when making energy decisions and 
investments, installations assume unnecessary exposure to the risks listed above, leaving 
them vulnerable to potential mission failure.  
According to the paper, DOD separates energy into two categories, operational 
and installation. The authors state that “while external costs are included in the 
accounting for operational energy, the opposite is true with respect to the methodology 
applied to energy required to sustain fixed U.S. DOD installations” (p. 3). Only the 
commodity market price is considered for installation costs. The distinction between 
operational and installation energy is important because the result is an undervaluation of 
installation energy. 
The authors further claim that there are “no widely recognized financial metrics to 
monetize the value of energy security and reliability,” (p. 10) which is a major 
contribution to the undervaluation of installation energy. However, “The National 
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Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL) developed a methodology to quantify energy 
reliability for DOD, which assesses the Value of Electrical Energy Security (VEES). This 
produces a metric that characterizes an annual estimate of the cost of utility outages” 
(p. 10). The VEES is useful for our own research as it appears to be widely accepted as a 
means to quantify risk since it was used in multiple studies that we reviewed.  
This article recommends that DOD work to monetize energy security but that it 
lacks the appropriate data collection to do so. According to the authors, the levelized cost 
of energy should include the cost of risk. This paper does not identify installation risk 
factors nor a solution or model to incorporate them into an energy decisions or 
investments. 
2. Marine Corps Renewable Energy Planning and Installation Security 
In Analysis of Marine Corps Renewable Energy Planning to Meet Installation 
Energy Security Requirements, the authors discuss the DOD reliance on the commercial 
grid and gas infrastructure to power training and operations, which places “mission 
critical-operations at risk” (p. xviii). The authors then suggest that a possible way to 
measure risk is to quantify the costs of interruptions, i.e., loss in productivity, food 
spoilage, etc. By measuring these factors, commanders can identify their installation’s 
exposure to an unreliable grid in a quantifiable manner and develop strategies to mitigate 
these risks.  
The article finds that the price volatility of oil and natural gas is a risk of investing 
in fossil-fuel based energy generation. A solution to this vulnerability is investment in 
renewable energy (RE) sources, since they do not have the same market volatility. “Price-
risk mitigation enhances energy security when energy planners incorporate greater 
renewable resources over those rich in fossil fuels” (p. 10). 
The authors are consistent with a trend throughout the literature that the cost of 
energy is price plus risk, not cost alone. One particular way to quantify risk is the cost of 
interruption, which can be quantified using NREL’s VEES model. While interruption is 
an important factor in risk measurement, it is not the only consideration. In other words, 
an ideal energy decision-making model should incorporate more risk factors, such as 
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natural disaster probability, price volatility, and interruptions in fuel supplies to be more 
inclusive. 
C. RESILIENCE 
The literature on energy resilience consistently emphasizes that it is an important 
component of a secure energy infrastructure. However, resilience is rarely considered 
throughout energy investment decisions because of the difficulty in quantifying and 
measuring resilience. 
1. Measuring Resiliency 
The report, Measuring the Resilience of Energy Distribution Systems, published 
by the RAND corporation “reviewed literature on metrics for energy system resilience to 
help develop a framework for evaluating and improving the resilience of energy systems” 
(p. iii). The report was sponsored by the U.S. Department of Energy in support of the 
initial draft of the Quadrennial Energy Review (QER).  
The article reviewed definitions of resilience from the fields of public policy, 
engineering and academia. The main focus of this point in the article was not to be 
redundant in presenting information but rather eliminate terms that were not consistent in 
describing system characteristics (Willis & Loa, 2015). The review pointed out that 
consistencies exist when companies attempt to define energy resilience. The four 
repeating elements from the report are 
• resilience describes the state of service being provided by a system in 
response to a disruption 
• the state of a system depends on how it was designed and how it is 
operated  
• different responses will lead to different resilience at different costs 
• resilience of a system also depends on the timescale (pp. 3–4) 
These characteristics served as the foundation for a common resilience definition, 
however when defining metrics of resilience, other aspects such as service delivery, 
system design, system operation, disruption, costs and timescale are more important to 
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capture and serve as the foundation of metrics. While these aspects provide our research 
with a solid starting in organizing and developing specific risk and resilience factors, they 
are likely not all-inclusive for a DOD energy decision-making model. 
When developing a framework to organize the specific metrics identified in 
research, the article outlined five categories to organize various metrics of resiliency. The 
RAND model provides decision makers with a consistent measurement framework that is 
applicable across varying energy systems. The framework is presented in Figure 1. 
Figure 1.  RAND Corp Framework for Organizing Resilience Metrics 
	
Source: Willis, H. H., & Loa, K. (2015). Measuring the resilience of energy distribution 
systems. Santa Monica, CA: RAND. Retrieved from https://www.rand.org 
/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR800/RR883/RAND_RR883.pdf 
While this framework provides a useful way to organize metrics, it does not serve 
as a functional model. The categories and examples of inputs are helpful in establishing 
quantitative values but the lack of functionality and applicability to a specific case leaves 
a gap in our research. Further research is necessary to develop this framework into a 
model that decision makers can apply to energy investments at naval shore installations. 
The article also provides a useful compilation of resilience metrics used among 
electric power, refined oil, and natural gas distribution systems, from the local to national 
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level. RAND provided the following metrics that are useful to our research: key 
replacement equipment stockpile, energy storage, number of workers, reserve/spare 
capacity, failure rate, resilience index, and survivability.  
The article does not provide insight or information on systems that rely heavily on 
renewable energy. Many of the metrics may be well suited; however, further research is 
necessary in order to develop metrics specific to a renewable energy system.  
2. Energy Resiliency at Barstow 
A previous NPS thesis, Energy Resiliency for Marine Corps Logistics Base 
Production Plant Barstow, incorporated the use of renewable energy generation to the 
existing power consumption in order to reduce costs and increase energy infrastructure 
resiliency. The thesis provided cost estimates for implementing on-site power generation 
and micro-grid alternatives at Production Plant Barstow. The authors calculated the NPV 
of three different energy portfolios using capital cost, O&M, VEES, and a degradation 
factor over a 20-year time period. This directly relates to our research as a method of 
quantifying the resiliency built into an energy investment. The thesis concludes that an 
energy system with renewable sources is more resilient. However, the framework falls 
short of measuring the actual value of resiliency.  
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As discussed earlier, energy planners do not consider the full range of decision 
variables when investing in energy projects. Cost and DOD policy are the driving force 
behind energy decisions while risk and resiliency are not prioritized appropriately. A 
critical assumption energy planners make is that the operating environment will remain in 
a normal state; however, risk mitigation and increased resiliency become extremely 
valuable when energy systems experience conditions outside the norm. Natural disasters, 
domestic terrorist attacks, and highly volatile and unreliable fossil fuel production and 
distribution networks create environments where assumptions about normal and steady-
state operations do not hold true. Therefore, to achieve resiliency, energy planners should 
consider these environments and the associated risk factors throughout the evaluation 
process. The intent of this project is to create a simple method of quantifying intangible 
energy factors, which will better inform energy planners of the risks associated with a 
brittle energy infrastructure operating outside of a normal environment. This will allow 
energy planners to invest with a full scope of awareness. 
B. MULTIPLE ATTRIBUTE BACKGROUND 
Since planners for shore installations have many different options to consider with 
energy projects, the decision is complex, requiring an approach that appropriately 
weights the costs, life span, risks, and pros and cons of each project. Multiple Attribute 
Utility Analysis (MAUA) is a tool for “evaluating and comparing alternatives to assist in 
decision making about complex alternatives” (State University of New York University 
at Albany, 2012). MADA (multiple attribute decision analysis) and MAUT (multiple 
attribute utility theory) are other variations and are explained in detail later. For the 
purposes of this project, MAUA and MADA are synonymous, while MAUT refers to the 
overarching theory of multiple attribute analysis.  
MAUA is intended to help planners make comprehensive decisions after 
determining the best choice through exploration of alternatives and consequence analysis. 
“MAUA models provide a way to score, evaluate, and compare possible alternatives and 
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offer a quantifiable method for choosing options” (State University of New York 
University at Albany, 2012). Comparing different energy projects across a standardized 
decision making model serves as a means to eliminate bias toward one particular project 
and objectively consider and evaluate each project compared with an alternative. 
1. Why MAUA 
The appeal of MAUA for an energy decision-making model is quantification, 
adaptability, and inclusion of all decision factors. First, quantifying intangible but 
important considerations such as the energy storage ability of a project, an 
infrastructure’s reliance on the commercial grid, price volatility of fossil fuels, and the 
probability of natural disasters is a difficult and subjective task. Typical energy 
investments include primarily cost factors (initial costs, O&M, life cycle etc.), leaving 
other important considerations out of the decision process. MAUA provides planners 
with a method to identify and quantify intangible risk factors that can be used as inputs 
for a decision model. 
MAUA’s adaptability makes it relevant to a continually evolving energy 
environment. As new technology emerges, the model can be adapted to include new 
decision factors that may not have been relevant in the past, and eliminate factors no 
longer requiring evaluation. MAUA’s flexibility allows for comparison of an unlimited 
number of projects across an unlimited number of risks or decision considerations. 
Factors can be added and deleted as necessary allowing for real-time evolvement. 
Additionally, MAUA can be utilized as an evaluation tool for a shore installation’s entire 
energy infrastructure, not just comparison of individual energy projects. We will discuss 
this application later.  
Since most energy investments exclude risk and resiliency factors, MAUA is 
helpful in making all-inclusive decisions. The first two words, “Multi Attribute,” 
explicitly state the foundation of this methodology. Each energy project has pros and 
cons that stretch beyond cost, yet they currently are not evaluated in a way that considers 
unique attributes, risk factors, and resiliency. By incorporating multiple categories and 
sub-categories of decision considerations, MAUA becomes an attractive solution to a one 
dimensional energy investment strategy.  
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2. eROI Analysis 
The decision making model developed for this project incorporates aspects of the 
Navy’s eROI model. Using MADA as the foundation, the eROI tool is intended to analyze 
potential energy investments and ensure they are risk based, capability focused, and will yield 
favorable ROI’s. The output of the eROI tool is a single digit number, calculated as the 
estimated benefit to cost ratio (B/C) of the project being evaluated. More specifically, the B/C 
represents the present value of the project’s anticipated contribution to energy cost savings 
and its contribution to supporting Navy energy objectives. A B/C ratio greater than 1.0 
indicates the benefits outweigh the costs. Conversely, a B/C of less than 1.0 indicates the 
project will not break even. Figure 2 shows the drivers (blue boxes), the weight of each 
driver, the metric used to calculate the score of each driver and the measure used to quantify. 
The Navy’s perception is that these drivers represent 100% of what is necessary to provide 
secure energy to shore installations.  
Figure 2.  eROI Drivers and Metrics 
 
Source: Commander, Navy Installations Command. (2011, December). eROI template 




eROI evaluates both quantitative and qualitative data. The first two drivers shown 
in Figure 2, “Maximize Financial Benefits” and “Minimize Shore Energy Consumption” 
can be objectively and accurately measured because their performance metrics provide 
quantifiable data. The other three drivers however, contain subjective data and intangible 
metrics. To quantify these drivers and metrics, the eROI model uses a simple rating scale. 
For example, the “Develop Enabling Infrastructure” driver is composed of several 
subjective metrics. Using a scale of zero to ten or zero to one hundred allows the user to 
assess, evaluate and determine an appropriate score based on the perceived quality of 
each metric.  
The application of eROI and how the Navy chooses energy projects is fairly 
straight forward. As shown in Figure 3, projects A, B, C, D, etc. are evaluated using the 
eROI tool and then assigned a B/C ratio or eROI score. Then, they are ranked and 
prioritized according to the B/C ratio from highest to lowest. The higher the eROI score, 
the higher priority. Pending available funding, the Navy begins work on an energy 
project at the top of the list and slowly works to the bottom of the list completing all 
projects with an eROI score greater than 1.0. 
Figure 3.  eROI Project Selection Process 
  
Source: Commander, Navy Installations Command. (2011, December). eROI template 




In short, the eROI tool collects the perceived important information about each 
energy project under consideration and evaluates it comparatively based on an output 
score.  
3. eROI Gaps and Limitations 
The eROI tool provides a robust framework for assessing energy investments; 
however, it falls short of capturing the entire breadth of factors effecting energy projects 
and infrastructure. The primary focus of eROI is the NPV of the investment costs. While 
NPV is an important factor, particularly as energy planners are faced with constrained 
budgets and sequestration, failing to consider risk and resiliency leaves energy projects 
and installations vulnerable to the potentially catastrophic consequences of natural 
disasters, domestic terrorist, and the fragile and unreliable commercial grid. Ultimately, 
risks that could be mitigated if the decision-making process was more inclusive, erodes 
the Navy’s path to energy security and independence. In a fiscally constrained 
environment, costs cannot be ignored, however they should be viewed on a similar plain 
as other metrics that are strategic to the operation and life cycle of the system. 
Naval leadership identifies cost as the dominate factor for energy projects, 
evidenced by the 39% weighting of NPV in the eROI tool. Captain James Goudreau, 
deputy assistant secretary of the Navy Energy, challenges the current eROI metrics, 
assessing that the tool fails to provide energy planners with the framework necessary to 
make the best decisions.  
Goudreau identifies assumptions regarding the stability of the environment as a 
major flaw in today’s energy decision-making process. Today’s energy infrastructure 
provides reliable and secure energy under reliable and secure conditions. However, when 
installations experience conditions outside of the normal working environment, energy 
generation is neither reliable nor secure. A natural disaster, deliberate attack, or failure of 
the commercial grid has the potential to leave an installation without power for prolonged 
periods. The primary back up power source for most installations is diesel generators that 
are intended to provide electricity for one to three days. An installation that is required to 
conduct operations during an outage longer than a few days will likely fail if completely 
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reliant on power from diesel generators. Reliable and secure energy is most essential 
during severe conditions, yet these environments are not fully considered when 
evaluating energy projects. The eROI tool and energy planners fail to recognize that the 
resiliency of an energy project is not defined during normal operation but rather during 
stressful or extreme conditions.  
eROI also fails to factor in the effect an outage has on readiness. During an 
outage, an installation’s operational capacity is limited unless they have a more reliable 
means of back up than diesel generators. For example, a week’s delay of fuel or logistical 
replenishment to deployed forces from a hurricane affects the readiness and capability of 
overseas operations. Unresilient back up generation is the result of a near-sighted 
approach. Power is provided for the first 24–72 hours but what happens after that? eROI 
does not capture the full scope of energy investment considerations. 
The Naval Facilities Engineering Command (NAVFAC) assesses that eROI falls 
short of capturing the full scope of pros and cons of an energy project. For example, 
installation of a photovoltaic (PV) field supports many DOD and DON energy policies 
and decreases variable costs at the installation. A model that strongly favors cost metrics 
views a PV field as an ideal investment. However, eROI fails to realize the downside of 
such a project from a risk and resiliency lens. A limitation of renewable energy 
generation is storage capability and when the commercial grid fails, the amount of energy 
a PV can generate is irrelevant because it is not independent from the grid. While a PV 
field is a favorable investment from a cost and environmental perspective, it actually does 
very little toward energy security and independence. The eROI tool may return a 
favorable on a project but most shore installations are still at the mercy of the commercial 
grid and eROI does not properly reflect that risk. 
A further limitation with the eROI tool is its adaptability. While the tool does 
provide planners with a logical framework to assess energy projects and compare them 
with alternatives, it is limited to comparing individual projects and does not serve as a 
means to evaluate an installation’s entire energy infrastructure. If a Commanding Officer 
is concerned of his installation’s energy generation and back up infrastructure, he 
currently has no analytical tool to provide an evaluation. A model is necessary that 
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provides leaders with energy information and metrics and information not just for a 
particular energy component or project but for the installation’s entire energy 
infrastructure as well. 
Placing too much value on the financial metrics of an energy project presents 
leaders with a biased and incomplete evaluation. Assessing and debating energy projects 
with a more complete list of metrics that include risk and resiliency, allows leaders to 
make better informed decisions regarding energy investments. 
4. Pepperdine MAUA Application 
The decision model developed for this project is largely based off of a case study 
conducted at Pepperdine University. The project combined MADA and MAUT to help 
Pepperdine’s Center for Sustainability (CFS) prioritize multiple competing energy 
projects in an attempt to reach the university’s goal of reducing electricity consumption 
on campus by 10%. MADA provides a systematic approach to complex decisions where 
a traditional structured approach is not sufficient. For example, a shore installation energy 
planner has the funding and flexibility to implement one of two options: 1) install solar 
panels or 2) initiate an energy savings plan. The traditional approach is to conduct some 
sort of cost analysis where initial costs, O&M, and long-term savings are calculated. 
However, as previously stated, cost is only one piece of the puzzle and other factors in 
addition to costs should be considered. Thus, the decision becomes more complex 
requiring further critical analysis. Since risk and resiliency factors are not typically 
quantified in the same manner as cost and savings, converting all comparative metrics to 
a common measurement unit is necessary to ensure an “apples-to-apples” comparison. 
MADA is a commonly accepted method to approach problems like this. According to the 
Pepperdine case, MADA consists of four steps in its most basic form:  
1. Framing of the decision and identification of the goals and objectives to be 
achieved by the decision maker 
2. Identify all decision alternatives and any related attributes that address the 
decision making objectives 
3. Specify preferences, both for each of the individual attributes and between 
the attributes in the framework 
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4. Ranking of the decision alternatives according to the specified 
preferences, given the attribute data for each of the alternatives (Hahn, 
Seaman, & Bikel, 2012)  
In the shore installation energy example, tradeoffs are necessary, requiring a 
debate of competing priorities. If the three major categories of consideration are risk, 
resiliency, and cost, each project will likely have a different score for each category. The 
solar panel project may come with high cost savings but little to no resiliency while the 
energy savings plan may yield lower savings but carry lower risk and high resiliency. The 
tradeoff in this scenario and the question for energy planners is how much cost savings 
must a project generate to accept a higher level of risk and lower level of resiliency?  
Combining MAUT and MADA develops common units of measurement and 
specifies the energy planner’s preference for each category. The Pepperdine case asserts 
that MAUT is applied via the following three steps: 
1. defining attributes by which the decision objectives will be measured; 
2. normalizing the measurement or scale of all attributes across all 
alternatives; and 
3. weighting the preferences between those attributes (Hahn, Seaman, & 
Bikel, 2012) 
The first step, defining attributes, is subjective and in the case of energy projects 
will likely change as technology matures. For example, a “resiliency” category might 
include attributes such as energy conservation and energy storage ability since they can 
have significant impact on the resiliency of an energy project. The attributes may change 
as conservation and storage technology develop.  
The second step is accomplished by using a standardized scale such as a 0–10 
score for each attribute. The last step is subjective. Preferences for attributes will vary 
depending on the perceived value of each  
Using MADA and MAUT, Pepperdine developed the following seven-step 
process to assess competing energy projects objectively: 
1. Identify alternatives; 
2. Clarify the goals and objectives, and organize them into a hierarchy; 
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3. Identify measures; 
4. Quantify measures for each alternative; 
5. Delineate preferences for attributes; 
6. Delineate preferences between attributes; and 
7. Rank alternatives. (Hahn, Seaman, & Bikel, 2012) 
The output of the Pepperdine model, shown in Figure 4, is a ranking of each 
alternative along with a utility for each category.  
Figure 4.  Pepperdine Case Study Results 
 
Source: Hahn, W. J., Seaman, S. L., & Bikel, R. (2012). Making decisions with ultiple 
attributes: A case in sustainability planning. Graziadio Business Review. 
CFS administrators hypothesized that “metering buildings” would be the best 
option to reach their energy reduction goal and were surprised to see that the model 
rejected their hypothesis. This type of realization is where MADA is valuable. Projects 
that would not have otherwise been considered are suddenly a primary option. Often 
times, without a measurable and objective method for considering alternatives, bias 
toward one particular project will cause that project to prevail. MADA minimizes bias 
and ranks projects objectively based on perceived value of goals and objectives.  
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C. HOW MAUA IS USED IN THIS PROJECT 
In order to incorporate environments outside the norm and influence energy 
planners to consider factors beyond cost, we developed a model that includes multiple 
attributes related to energy investments. This model allows the user to address what 
project alternatives to consider, gain a more accurate understanding of goals and 
expectations, and further allows for subjective input and important debate of the pros and 
cons of the projects. Using MAUA as the foundation, a seven-step model guides the end 
user (in this case the energy project decision makers) from project inception to 
completion. Our model utilizes the following steps: 
• 1. Identify alternatives  
• 2. Clarify the goals and objectives, and organize them in a hierarchy 
• 3a. Identify fundamental categories 
• 3b. Quantify fundamental categories 
• 4a. Identify category attributes 
• 4b. Quantify category attributes 
• 5. Normalize category and attribute values 
• 6. Calculate total project score and rank alternatives. (Hahn, Seaman, & 
Bikel, 2012) 
D. MODEL EXPLANATION 
Figure 5 represents the Navy’s current weighting of energy categories according 
to eROI alongside the changes suggested for this project. 
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Figure 5.  Comparison of current categories and weights vs. suggested 
changes 
 
Adapted from Commander Naval Installations. (2011, December). eROI template users 
manual. Retrieved November 13, 2015, from http://www.districtenergy.org 
/assets/pdfs/2012-Campus-Arlington/Presentations/Bus-Dev-CEAC-
Workshop/BIZDEV6BOYETTEIDEA-presentation-eROI-Templatev3.pdf 
While the current method seems like a more inclusive model, the proposed model 
offers the same considerations in a more streamlined version with a redistribution of 
priorities. For example, the eROI category “Energy Consumption,” which is valued at 9% 
is now part of the resiliency category in the new model, and “Reliable Energy” is part of 
both the risk and resilience categories. Nothing is sacrificed under the new model; the 
priorities are similar but with more emphasis on risk and resiliency and less on cost. 
Figure 6 presents the energy decision-making model developed for this project. It 
consists of four overarching categories (risk, resiliency, cost, and policy) that total 100% 
of considerations when making energy investment decisions. Below each category is a 
list of attributes that define and describe each category. Using a Likert scale, each 
attribute is assessed according to the model description (detailed later in the chapter) and 
assigned a score between zero and five. 
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Figure 6.  Energy Investment Decision Model 
 
 
Table 2 is a description of the scoring scale for the model. Though the same zero- 
to-five scale is used for the whole model, each category is scored differently depending 
on the metric.  
Table 2.   Scoring Criteria and Metrics 
Score Risk Resiliency Cost Policy 






NPV/Total Cost How many 
DOD/DON 
policies are 
supported by the 
project?  






-51% and below Supports 0 
1 Risk is not 
effected 
Resiliency is not 
effected 




















150% and above Supports 5 
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Each category’s attributes are summed and then weighted against their respective 
category’s percentage. For example, if risk is valued at 25% and the category attributes 
sum to 15.5 out of a maximum score of 20, then the overall risk score is calculated as 
25% x (15.5/20) = 19.4%, with the maximum score being 25%. The same step is repeated 
for each of the four categories and their respective attributes. The weighted scores from 
each category are then summed to yield a total project score. This process is repeated for 
each project or alternative. Therefore, if three energy investments are being considered, 
each project should be run through the model for a total of three project scores.  
The first step in the process is to determine the alternatives. The model effectively 
compares the scores of each category and respective attributes across different options. 
For example, if a shore installation is considering installing a solar energy system, that 
technology should be compared to alternatives in order to identify strengths and 
weaknesses. Alternatives include wind power, geothermal energy, hydroelectric power, 
and any other reasonable substitution for solar. Since the output is a numerical value, 
having other projects to compare and contrast with provides more useful information than 
running just a single project through.  
Since the concept of the model is new, foundational scores for the overarching 
categories (risk, resiliency, cost, and policy) do not exist. In other words, if a project 
scores a 19.4% in the risk category, is that acceptable, good, or bad? A standard for 
comparison will develop as the model gains fidelity after continued and prolonged use. 
The acceptability of a score will also vary with the perceived value of the category. The 
model uses an equal 25% weight for each category, but that may be easily modified if 
policy, for example, is perceived to have a lower value than any of the other categories.  
The second step is to clarify the goals and objectives since they vary across 
organizations and at different levels of command. For example, an installation 
commander may have a short-term goal of reducing energy consumption by 10% over the 
next year. While, at the top of the goal hierarchy might be DON goal of increasing 
alternative energy use to 50% by 2020 or the DOD goal of increasing total renewable 
energy produced or procured as a percentage of total facility energy to 25% by 2025 (10 
U.S.C. 2911(e)). The point of this step is to clearly state the goals and objectives and 
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prioritize them to ensure that the energy projects under consideration will enable goal 
attainment.  
The third step consists of two parts: a) identify the fundamental categories and b) 
quantify them. For this model, the categories are risk, resiliency, cost, and policy. 
Theoretically, the number of categories is unlimited; however, the simplicity of this 
model is valuable to an organization as the category percentages and their respective 
attributes can be adjusted as necessary. Additionally, when comparing projects, the 
number of categories must be consistent so that the model produces comparable results. 
Evaluating one project under a model that utilizes four categories is not comparable to 
evaluating a different project under a model that utilizes five categories. Even though the 
total project score is always 100%, evaluating projects with inconsistent categories does 
not allow for an apples-to-apples comparison. 
Part b, quantification of the categories, depends largely on the perceived value of 
each category. The method of quantification is simple priority based allocation 
represented by percentages. The number of categories may vary but when all the 
category’s percentages are summed together, the total should always equal 100%. As 
Figure 6 implies, 100% of energy investment considerations fall into four categories 
weighted equally at 25% each. However, the user can easily adapt the model and modify 
the categories and their respective weights. Weighting the categories allows the user to 
identify priorities and determine a perceived value. In certain instances, risk may be a 
more valuable consideration than cost or policy. The percentages of each category should 
reflect priorities. 
The fourth step also consists of two parts: a) identify category attributes and b) 
quantify them. Table 3 displays the categories and attributes selected for this model, 
which will each be described in detail later in the chapter. The attributes serve as a means 
of defining the category and further represent variances and considerations that will occur 
throughout the life cycle of the project. Similar to the categories from step three, a 
consistent number of attributes is critical to the functionality of the model. For example, 
if one project is run through the model with four risk attributes then the total possible risk 
score is 20 (four attributes x a maximum possible score of five = 20). If the model is then 
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manipulated to include a fifth risk attribute, then the total possible score is 25. The result 
of the two different projects would not be an apples-to-apples comparison. The 
adaptability and flexibility of the model is advantageous to energy planners so long as the 
number of categories and associated attributes remains consistent when comparing 
potential projects. Furthermore, the model is essentially a living document and should be 
updated, manipulated, and experimented with by energy planners as technology 
progresses and priorities shift. 
Table 3.   Categories and Attributes 
Category: RISK RESILIENCY COST POLICY 
Attributes: Natural 
Disasters 
Localized Generation NPV/TC DOD 
 Terrorist Attack Conservation  DON 
 Commercial 
Grid Reliance 
Priority Distribution   
 Fossil fuel 
consumption 
Storage Ability   
  Repairability   
  Adaptability   
 
Part b, quantification of the attributes, is based on a Likert scale of zero (worst) to 
five (best). Energy planners will discuss and assess each category attribute and assign a 
value. For the attribute “natural disasters” in the risk category, planners debate such 
questions as: 
• Where is the location of the installation/project, and what is the most 
probable natural disaster (hurricane, tsunami, tornado, earthquake, etc.)? 
• What is the probability of occurrence?  
• What effect would a disaster have on the logistical chain? 
Another example: for the attribute “priority distribution” in the resiliency 
category, planners ask such questions as: 
• Does the project allow for control of energy distribution?  
• Will energy distribution from this project allow the mission critical nodes 
to receive energy before noncritical nodes?  
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A description of questions and considerations for each attribute is detailed later in 
the chapter. 
The fifth step is normalization. Since the categories are expressed in percentages 
and the attributes are scored from zero to five, they have to be normalized to a common 
scale. To normalize this data, the sum product is used. As Figure 7 shows, the resiliency 
category weighted at 25% is multiplied by the sum of the attributes (16.5 in this example) 
over the maximum score possible (30) for a total resiliency score of 13.8%. The same 
process is repeated for each category and its respective attributes. 
Figure 7.  Example of Fifth Step Evaluating Resiliency  
 
The sixth  and final step of the process is simply adding up the normalized data 
for single output score and then ranking the projects. Figure 8 depicts this process. The 
example project received a 48.2% out of a maximum score of 100% with four categories 




Figure 8.  Weighted Scores 
 
 
E. CATEGORY AND ATTRIBUTE DESCRIPTION 
The following is a description of each category’s attributes. When scoring and 
evaluating an energy project, the following questions serve as a guide to ensure energy 
planners discuss the necessary points of consideration for each category. 
1. Risk 
a. Natural Disasters 
1. Where is the location of the installation/project and what is the most 
probable natural disaster and how vulnerable is it to a hurricane, tsunami, 
tornado, earthquake, etc.?  
2. What is the probability of occurrence? Look at past natural disasters and 
consider the frequency. For example, an energy project on the eastern 
shores of Florida has a high probability of experiencing a hurricane. 
Energy planners would relate this factor to the most likely course of action 
(MLCOA).   
3. What is the range of effects? From the disasters discussed above, what is 
the worst damage possible? Referred to as the most deadly course of 
action (MDCOA). Energy planners should question the probability of the 
project enduring the range of effects. For example, could the project 
provide power during a Category 2 hurricane (MLCOA) or a Category 5 
hurricane (MDCOA)?  
4. What effect would a disaster have on the logistical chain? If the project is 
reliant on fossil fuels, can they still be distributed? Planners should also 
consider what effect non-local disasters would have. For example, would a 
natural disaster on the east coast disrupt fossil fuel production and 
distribution on the west coast?  
5. A high score indicates that the energy project can withstand even the worst 
damage caused by a natural disaster. Therefore, the overall risk from a 
natural disaster is low.  
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b. Terrorist Attack/Intelligent Adversary 
1. Does the installation/project supply power to mission critical nodes or 
installations? An energy project that supplies mission critical power is 
likely a more attractive target for a terrorist attack. If the project supplies 
power to non-mission critical nodes, then it is likely at a lower risk for 
attack.  
2. Where is the location of the installation/project? Most energy 
infrastructures and substations are located in remote areas, which is ideal 
for an attacker. If the project will be located in a well-lit and highly 
monitored area, then the probability of attack may be lower when 
compared with a remote and isolated project.  
3. What are the security measures in place to deter or prevent potential 
enemy action? Many substations are vulnerable due to their remote 
location and lack of security presence. A project located on a secure base 
with regular roving patrols carries a lower risk for attack than a project in 
a low population and remote area.  
4. What is the range of effects from an enemy attack? As with natural 
disasters, consider the MLCOA and MDCOA. Could a terrorist attack 
destroy this project completely or just cause minimal damage? What type 
of weapon or method of initiation may be used? Small arms, automatic 
weapons, varying types of improvised explosive devices (IED’s), rocket-
propelled grenades (RPG’s), and homemade explosives (HME) are among 
the possibilities.  
5. What is the chance of a cyber attack on this installation/project? It is 
important to remember that terrorist attacks are not limited to physical. 
With the growing threat of cyber attacks, energy projects include 
protective measures to counter or mitigate the risk of such an attack.  
c. Commercial Grid Reliance 
1. Is the project/installation solely reliant on the commercial grid? 
Alternatively, does the project have an independent back-up source or 
smart grid that will continue to provide power during an outage.  
2. What is the probability of brown or black out? While calculating a precise 
probability is unnecessary, past brown and black outs should be 
considered along with their severity, frequency, and duration.  
3. What is the probability of grid overload? Again, a precise number is not 
needed but the fragile and decaying state of most commercial grids leads 
to a chance of overload.  
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d. Fossil Fuel Consumption 
1. Is the project reliant on fossil fuel for energy generation? The more reliant 
a project on fossil fuel, the more risk it assumes. A primary risk with 
reliance on fossil fuels is price volatility.  
In the 1970s, the U.S. learned a painful lesson on the importance of 
energy security with the imposition of the OPEC oil embargo in 
1973. The sudden loss of over a million barrels per day of oil 
imports from the Middle East caused gasoline prices to jump from 
approximately 35 cents a gallon to over a dollar per gallon. As a 
rule of thumb, a $10 increase in price per barrel of oil means a $1.3 
billion increase to U.S. DOD’s annual energy bill. Exacerbating 
fossil fuel price volatility is the average $84 billion per year that 
U.S. DOD spends securing overseas oil transit routes and 
infrastructure to defend America’s fossil fuels reliance (Brower, et 
al., 2014).   
2. Resiliency 
a. Localized Generation 
1. Does the project have the ability to generate power locally or is it 100% 
reliant on the commercial grid? This is an energy independence question. 
If the project can function independently of the commercial grid, 
resilience has increased.  
2. Under what conditions can the project generate and distribute energy? 
What will inhibit generation and distribution? If the project can operate 
independently from the commercial grid, it will likely do so under normal 
operating conditions. However, the question here is asking if the project 
can maintain generation and distribution during an outage, natural disaster 
or another type of non-normal operating environment. 
3. How much power does the project generate in relation to demand 
requirements? In other words, is there more demand than generation? 
Demand and generation data should be collected and evaluated to ensure 
adherence to demand reduction goals and that the project meets the 
minimum requirements.  
4. Are generation methods diversified, or does power come from a single 
source? True resiliency is achieved when energy generation, transmission, 
and distribution is efficiently resourced. As discussed earlier in the 
literature review, the lessons learned from the GEJE provide evidence that 
a diversified energy portfolio with multiple sources of renewable energy 
counters the negative disruption effects from a natural disaster. One 
generation method (the commercial grid, for example) is a high risk, “all-
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in” scenario. If the grid goes down, energy generation and distribution is 
dependent on the back-up method, if one exists.  
b. Conservation 
1. What effects does this project have on demand? Will the project promote 
demand reduction or will it increase usage? Conservation is an integral 
part of energy security and independence, which is reinforced through 
stated DOD/DON goals and objectives.  
2. Is the project efficient? Efficiency is a subjective term so comparison 
against past or current projects and usage rates is a worthwhile 
measurement tool. A higher conservation score should be awarded to 
those projects using the most efficient energy resources and components 
(efficient lighting, appliances, and heating and cooling choices for 
example).  
c. Priority Distribution 
1. Does the project allow for control of which nodes receive energy? Will the 
mission critical nodes receive power before non-critical nodes? During an 
outage, mission critical nodes should receive power first. If the outage is 
prolonged, energy managers should have the ability to shut off power to 
non-critical nodes to ensure efficiency and conservation.  
2. Can the installation conduct mission critical operations during an outage 
or disruption? If the answer is no, or partially no, then does the energy 
project support mission critical operations? Mission critical operations 
should be prioritized first so the priority distribution score should be lower 
if the project supports non-mission critical assets or functions.  
d. Storage Ability 
1. Can the project store excess power for later usage? A limiting factor in 
renewable generation is storage ability. For example, a solar panel system 
may be able to generate power all day long but the energy infrastructure is 
no better off if that power cannot be stored over long periods and utilized 
during critical times such as during an outage or natural disaster.  
2. Other contributing factors to the storage ability score are: How much can 
be stored? (may be expressed in terms of a percentage of demand or in 
megawatts) and for how long? Can the stored energy be used during 
emergency or outage? A project that has limited or no storage ability 
should receive a very low score. 
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e. Repairability 
1. Are repair teams on site? What is their response time? What is the 
knowledge level? Can they repair every part of the system? Energy 
resiliency extends beyond the system or project itself to the quantity and 
quality of the repair and maintenance team. A team with experience and 
familiarity with the energy project or infrastructure is a valuable resource 
during an outage or emergency. The repairability score should closely 
consider the technical knowledge and experience level of the operators in 
charge.  
2. What back up parts are kept on hand? How long will it take to order parts 
not kept on? How long to manufacture if not available right away? Since 
energy projects are unique, repair parts are often manufactured by a single 
provider, which may lead to extended waiting periods. Often times, 
specific components are made to order, extending waiting periods for 
months or longer. An energy project could potentially be nonoperational 
for months while waiting for a manufacturer to ship parts or have them 
made.  
f. Adaptability 
1. How does the project fit in with existing infrastructure? Does the 
infrastructure require major changes in order to accommodate the new 
project? A resilient energy project should be adaptable to new and older 
technology as to minimize potential future costs.   
3.  Cost 
To capture the financial parameters of a project accurately, energy planners 
estimate cash outflows and inflows over the lifetime of the project. Estimating the initial 
investment (capital), Operation and maintenance costs, cost savings or income 
generation, and other associated costs allows for a net present value (NPV) calculation, 
which provides a snapshot of the financial condition of a potential investment. Since 
energy projects have a wide range of NPV’s that depend on size and scope, scaling the 
projects allows for a uniform comparison of high and low cost investments. For example, 
when two different projects have NPV’s of $1M and $50k, ranking them is difficult 
because the NPV is just one of the project’s many financial metrics. However, expressing 
NPV as a percentage of the total project cost allows for a more accurate comparison 
when ranking separate projects. Viewing NPV as a percentage of total cost provides more 
insight into the monetary picture of a project than NPV as a stand-alone metric, thus 
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giving more fidelity to the analysis. Furthermore, it allows the user to objectively 
compare a project costing millions of dollars to one that costs thousands.  
Using financial data from three previously approved NSAM energy projects, we 
developed a Likert scale for the NPV/TC metric. The small sample size of three projects 
is a limitation discussed in the Conclusion chapter. Using the financial information 
available, we calculated the NPV/TC for each project, and then found the average 
NPV/TC along with the standard deviation of the data set. The average NPV/TC is 
50.49% with a standard deviation of 52.87%. See Table 4 for data used for calculations. 
Table 4.   NSAM Energy Projects 
 
Adapted from Naval Support Activity Monterey Energy Office. (2015a). P852 v.21 eroi 
NSAM fy18 lighting ECIP_03-03-2015 [unpublished Excel spreadsheet]. Department of 
Defense, Naval Support Acitivity Monterey Energy Office. (2015b). Rm12-3932 eroi v2 
NSAM b304 b305 hvac 07–14-2015 [unpublished Excel spreadsheet]. Department of 
Defense unpublished & Naval Support Acitivity Monterey Energy Office. (2015c). Rm12 
3933 rme b246 fy15 eroi 07–01-2015 [unpublished Excel spreadsheet].  
As shown in Table 5, a score of three on the Likert scale represents the average 
NPV/TC calculated from NSAM data. Each standard deviation increases or decreases the 
Likert scale value by one. 
  
NPV total(cost eroi percentage(of(NPV
LED 3,078,322.00$(( 2,778,456.00$(( 1.44 110.79%
HVAC(in(glasgow 65,344.00$((((((( 540,000.00$((((( 1.47 12.10%





Table 5.   NPV/Total Cost Scoring Scale 
Score Cost 
Metric NPV/Total Cost 





5 150% and above 
 
To calculate NPV/TC, perform the following steps: 
1. Calculate the net present value (NPV) of project. Use estimates of initial 
capital cost, Operations and Maintenance costs, savings realized in energy 
cost and other factors of costs and savings that are achieved from the 
project. See Appendix A for example. 
2. Divide calculated NPV from step one by the total cost of project. Assign a 
value from the Likert scale in Table 5 based on results. 
4. Policy 
The policy score is calculated against the following five energy objectives: (the 
first four are DOD’s standard and the last is a DON objective: 
1. The Energy Independence and Security Act (EISA) of 2007, which states 
that the DOD will reduce energy intensity relative to FY 2003 baseline. 
2. Energy Policy Act of 2005 directs DOD to consume more electric energy 
from renewable sources.   
3. Title 10 U.S.C. 2911(e) directs DOD to produce or procure more energy 
from renewable sources. 
4. Executive Order 13423 requires DOD to reduce potable water intensity 
relative to FY 2007 baseline (Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense 
(Energy, Installations, and Environment), 2015). 
5. “Increase Alternative Energy Ashore. By 2020, DON will produce at least 
50% of shore based energy requirements from alternative sources; 50% of 
DON installations will be net-zero” (Department of the Navy, 2012). 
When scoring each attribute, energy planners will assess whether or not the 
project complies with the objective. If the project supports the objective and assists in 
meeting the criteria, the attribute will receive a 1. If the project does not support the 
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objective’s criteria, it will be scored a 0. Therefore, the total possible score for the policy 
category is a six if the project supports all of the objectives. 
F. CONCLUSIONS 
Given the increased visibility of energy consumption and the trend toward 
renewables in today’s fiscally constrained environment, energy planners face complex 
problems and overwhelming options requiring a variety of approaches before reaching a 
conclusion. Ultimately, the decision to approve or reject an energy project must be 
justified and supported with a logical and sequential decision making process. MAUA 
theory and the decision-making model developed for this project, provide a framework 
that considers quantitative data such as cost and savings over time, and qualitative data 
such as price volatility of fossil fuels and the storage ability of an energy project. The 
model is flexible and easily adaptable by modifying the weights of each category based 
on perceived value as well as adding and subtracting attributes of each category. 
Ultimately, the new decision model is a more comprehensive tool than the status quo.  
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IV. DATA ANALYSIS 
To validate the model developed for this project, we collected and analyzed data 
on an alternative energy generation project known as the Bloom Box. The Bloom Box, 
explained in detail below, provides reliable power independent of the commercial grid, 
which ultimately increases energy security through reduced risk and increased resiliency. 
The Bloom Box was analyzed utilizing the current energy investment tool, eROI, and 
then again with the energy decision model developed for this project. Finally, the 
outcomes of the Bloom Box projected from each model are compared and contrasted. 
A. BLOOM BOX BACKGROUND 
According to Bloom Energy, a Bloom Energy Server, commonly referred to as a 
Bloom Box, is a solid oxide fuel cell capable of providing electricity in place of 
traditional generation via the commercial grid. Each fuel cell consists of a disc made 
from processed beach sand that has been ground up and pressed into a ceramic, card-like 
object. The fuel cell card, shown in Figure 9, is then coated on one side with Bloom 
Energy’s specialized green ink and the opposite side with different specialized black ink 
This process is referred to as powder to power by Bloom CEO and Co-founder K.R. 
Sridhar (loadevery, 2010).  
Figure 9.  Bloom Box Fuel Cell 
 
Source: Buchanan, M. (2010, February 24). Giz explains: Fuel cells and Bloom Energy’s 
miracle box. Retrieved November 28, 2015, from Gizmodo: http://gizmodo.com/ 
5479460/giz-explains-fuel-cells-and-bloom-energys-miracle-box 
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Independently, the fuel cells produce enough energy to power one light bulb or 
approximately 25 watts, which is not a practical amount of power; however, when 
combined and stacked to form a server or a system, as shown in Figure 10, their capacity 
increases exponentially. While the capability of a Bloom Box depends on a number of 
demand and usage factors, a 2010 report from Gizmodo, estimates that one 100kw server 
has the capacity to power a 30,000 sq. ft. office building or 100 homes (Buchanan, 2010). 
According to a Bloom Energy (2010) press release, a server is “the size of an average 
parking space,” though research and development has led to decreased sizes as the 
kilowatt per hour capacity increases.  
Figure 10.   Fuel Cell to Solution Process 
 
Adapted from Buchanan, M. (2010, February 24). Giz explains: Fuel cells and Bloom 
Energy’s miracle box. Retrieved November 28, 2015, from Gizmodo: 
http://gizmodo.com/5479460/giz-explains-fuel-cells-and-bloom-energys-miracle-box 
As shown in Figure 11, the Bloom Box functions by pumping oxygen in on one 
side of the card and a fuel source to the other. The two then combine within the cell 
producing a chemical reaction that produces electricity. The fuel source used within these 
cells varies depending on the customer and according to K.R. Sridhar, can be fossil fuels 
such as natural gas, renewable fuels such as landfill gas, to biofuels or solar. This allows 




Figure 11.  Bloom Energy Server Fuel Cell 
 
Adapted from Patil, V., & Chindhi, P. (n.d.). Bloom Energy technology. IOSR Journal of 
Electronics and Communication Engineering, 6(66), pp. 1–6. Retrieved from 
http://iosrjournals.org/iosr-jece/papers/sicete-volume6/66.pdf 
A report, Bloom Energy Technology, published by the Journal of Electronics and 
Communication Engineering estimates a 200kw server to cost from $700,000 to 
$800,000. The large initial capital requirement has limited expansion in the consumer 
market; however according to Bloom Energy’s website, companies such as FedEx, 
Walmart, and Target are commercial customers.  
DOD could conceivably invest in a Bloom Box server or system on a test basis to 
experience the cost savings and experiment with alternative generation as a primary 
and/or backup source of power. The risks associated with the commercial grid decrease 
significantly and having a localized, on-site generation source provides lays the 
groundwork for a resilient infrastructure. Since the Bloom Box has an immediate impact 
on risk and resiliency, it is a useful project to demonstrate the model developed for this 
research.   
B. BLOOM BOX EVALUATION UNDER EROI 
We analyzed the Bloom Box in order to demonstrate a potential outcome and 
decision regarding the investment quality according to eROI metrics. The following 
evaluation is a hypothetical situation where a 250kw Bloom Box is installed and supplies 
100% of the power to the Dudley Knox Library, which has an unverified peak demand of 
200kw. The library is a non-critical office building on the main campus of NSAM. The 
evaluation is organized consistently with the five eROI drivers: maximizing financial 
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benefits, minimizing shore energy consumption, providing reliable energy, compliance 
with regulatory and shareholders expectancies, and developing enabling infrastructure.  
1. Maximizing Financial Benefits 
eROI evaluates the financial benefits of a project according to three cost-related 
criteria: investment cost, energy savings or costs, and non-energy savings or costs.  
a. Investment Cost 
The investment cost section calculates the NPV of construction costs, planning, 
designing disposal and operation and maintenance. Construction costs are irrelevant for 
the Bloom Box since DOD will simply purchase the actual hardware. However, initial 
up-front capital required to purchase a Bloom Box is estimated at $800,000 per box for 
their most powerful server that produces 250kw of continuous power (Patil & Chindhi). 
This cost includes installation and a physical site to hold the hardware. 
The next investment cost is a fuel source and as stated earlier, fuel sources can 
vary from fossil fuels to renewables, though natural gas is the most common. A report 
from The University of Chicago, found that a single Bloom Box “consumes natural gas at 
a rate of 661 cubic feet per hour” (Bassett, England, Li, Weinberger, & Wong). Since 
Bloom Box has a life expectancy of ten years, we collected data from the U.S. Energy 
Information Administration website, and calculated the average price of natural gas over 
the past decade, which is $8.19 per thousand cubic feet. Assuming the Dudley Knox 
Library requires continuous electricity for eight hours per day and five days per week, the 
monthly natural gas consumption is 105,760 cu. ft. 0.661	&'. ().×	40	ℎ-'./	01.	2113	×	4	2113/	 = 	105,760	&'. (). 01.	8-9)ℎ  
The cost of that consumption is approximately $866 per month, which equates to 
a $10,392 natural gas bill. 105,760	&'. (). 01.	8-9)ℎ1000 	= 	105.76	×	$8.19	01.	)ℎ-'/=9>	&'. ()	= 	$866	01.	8-9)ℎ	×	12	8-9)ℎ/	 = 	$10,392 
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b. Energy Savings or Cost 
Energy savings or cost is calculated as the difference between the cost for 
electricity from the commercial grid and the cost of electricity for the Bloom Box. The 
report, Bloom Energy Technology, mentioned earlier in the chapter, calculates the Bloom 
Box energy cost as $0.08 to $0.09 per kwh (kilowatt hour) and $0.13 to $0.14 as the 
typical cost per kwh in California (p. 3). The net result is an average savings of $0.045 
per kwh, which equates to monthly savings $1,800 and annual savings of $21,600.  $0.045	01.	32ℎ	×	25032ℎ	= 	$11.25	01.	ℎ-'.	×	40	ℎ-'./	01.	2113	×	4	2113/	01.	8-9)ℎ	= 	$1,800	×	12	8-9)ℎ/	 = 	$21,600	 
Using only energy cost savings, the payback period for one Bloom Box is over 37 
years. $800,000	A9A)A=B	&-/)$21,600	=99'=B	/=CA9D/ 	= 	37.03	E1=./ 
c. Non-Energy Savings or Cost 
This section addresses dollars saved or spent on maintenance, staff employment, 
repairs or replacement to equipment, and any other recurring or non-recurring savings or 
costs. Once the Bloom Server is in place and fully operational, the yearly fixed 
maintenance cost is approximately $264 (Adams, Chowdhary, & Subbaiah, 2011) over 
the estimated lifespan of ten years. The cost of energy maintenance on DOD installations 
varies. On the main campus of NSAM, the Navy owns and maintains the grid. At other 
bases, the local utility owns the wires up to the point of entry to each building, and each 
building has a utility-owned meter. Lastly, some bases are a mixture of the two 
ownership variations. Estimates for energy maintenance at NSAM is $0.02 per kwh, 
which means that the estimated annual maintenance cost at a building that draws 200kw 
is $7,680. $0.02	32ℎ	×	20032	 = $4	01.	ℎ-'.	x	40	ℎ-'./	01.	2113	x	4	2113/	01.	8-9)ℎ	= $640	01.	8-9)ℎ	x	12	8-9)ℎ/	 = 	$7,680 
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The net result is an annual maintenance savings of $7,416. $7,680	 − 	$264	 = 	$7,416 
d. NPV 
The last step of the investment costs section is calculating the NPV. The Office of 
Management and Budget released a memorandum in January 2015 that establishes 
guidelines and discount rates for benefit-cost analysis of federal programs. The real 
interest rate for a ten-year investment is 0.9%. Using the costs identified above, one 
Bloom Box has an NPV of -$600,135. See Appendix for calculations. 
2. Minimizing Shore Energy Consumption 
An efficient energy generation method limits greenhouse gas emissions and 
ultimately minimizes shore energy consumption. This section calculates a net gain or less 
on the greenhouse gas emissions produced by the projected fuel source (natural gas) for 
the Bloom Box vs. the commercial grid. To score this driver, eROI compares the 
electricity produced by the Bloom Box to the emission it would had taken to produce the 
same amount of energy conventionally, and is measured by its output of CO2 (carbon 
dioxide), CH4 (methane), and NO2 (nitrous dioxide). Bloom Box claims their 250kw 
server emits between 735 lbs. and 849 lbs. of CO2 per megawatt hour (MWh) (Bloom 
Energy). The average of that range comes out to 792 lbs. per MWh (or 158.4lbs. per 
kwh), approximately half of what the commercial grid emits, as shown in Figure 12. At 
that rate, a Bloom Box powering a building drawing a continuous 200kw for 40 hours per 
week and four weeks per month emits approximately 5,068,800 lbs. of CO2 per month, 
while the annual emission is 60,825,600 lbs.  158.4	BH/. -(	IJK	01.	32ℎ	×	20032	 = 	31,680	BH/	-(	IJK 	31,680	BH/	-(	IJK	×	40	ℎ-'./	01.	2113	×	4	2113/	= 	5,068,800	BH/. -(	IJK	01.	8-9)ℎ	5,068,800	BH/. IJK	01.	8-9)ℎ	×	12	8-9)ℎ/	 = 	60,825,600	BH/. -(	IJK	
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Since the commercial grid produces approximately double the amount of 
emissions, we estimate the net CO2 emission reduction to be 60,825,600 lbs. Over the 
expected 10-year life span of a Bloom Box, over 608 million lbs. of CO2 emission is 
eliminated.  
Figure 12.  CO2 Emissions 
  
Source: Bloom Energy. (n.d.). Clean energy: Bloom Energy delivers better electrons. 
Retrieved November 29, 2015, from http://www.bloomenergy.com/clean-energy/ 
Though eROI also accounts for CH4 and NO2 emissions, Bloom Box CH4 and 
NO2 data was not available for this project. However, in each of the three eROI 
evaluations that we analyzed for this project, CO2 accounted for over 99% of total 
emissions, making CH4 + NO2 emissions account for less than 1%. While that 1% is not 
considered negligible, capturing 99% of the total emissions still describes a reliable and 
accurate picture of the emissions for Bloom Box. 
3. Provide Reliable Energy 
While the first two eROI drivers use quantitative data, providing reliable energy is 
both a quantitative and qualitative assessment. The evaluation is based on a project’s 
ability to provide reliable energy to critical facilities. The assessment is measured in 
terms of a mission dependency index (MDI), which prioritizes mission-critical facilities, 
frequency and duration of outages, the availability of backup power, and the project’s 
reliance on energy to conduct mission-essential tasks. The Bloom Box was scored 
according to the following five questions as per the eROI methodology: 
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1. How many mission critical facilities will receive new backup power as a 
result of this project? Zero, thus the score for this question is 0. The 
Bloom Box is employed as a primary power source and NSAM does not 
utilize backup generation.  
2. Enter the MDI score of the facility. We assess that the MDI score for the 
NSAM Dudley Knox Library is a 65. Table 6 represents the MDI 
scoring scale. The NSAM mission would continue if the library were not 
operational, therefore the facility is not mission critical. However, the 
Naval Postgraduate School would be significantly less capable of efficient 
education without full power to the library. 
Table 6.   Mission Dependency Index Scoring Scale 
70–100 Points Mission Critical Facilities 
31–69 Points Mission Dependent Facilities 
0–30 Points Mission Independent Facilities 
Adapted from Mission Dependency Index. (n.d.) Retrieved from 
http://www.assetinsights.net/Glossary/G_Mission_Dependency_Index.html  
3. Based on the average number of outages per year and their duration, how 
would you characterize the facility’s susceptibility to outages? In the past 
year, Dudley Knox Library experienced one outage lasting for less than 
six hours. The score for this question is a 2. Figure 13 represents the 
scoring scale for this question. 
Figure 13.  Susceptibility Scoring Scale 
   
Source: Naval Support Acitivity Monterey Energy Office. (2015a). P852 v.21 eroi NSAM 
fy18 lighting ECIP_03-03-2015[unpubished Excel spreadsheet].  
4. Does the critical infrastructure currently have backup power available? 
The library does not have backup power, therefore scores a 0. Figure 14 
represents the scoring scale for this question.  
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Figure 14.  Backup Power Availability Scoring Scale 
 
Source: Naval Support Acitivity Monterey Energy Office. (2015a). P852 v.21 eroi NSAM 
fy18 lighting ECIP_03-03-2015[unpublished Excel spreadsheet].  
5. Considering the level of current backup power indicated in question 4, 
what percentage of the critical infrastructure functions could you continue 
to perform during an outage, in any? Since NSAM does not employ 
backup generation, 0% of critical functions could be performed during an 
outage and therefore, scores a 0. Figure 15 represents the scoring scale for 
this question. 
Figure 15.  Critical Infrastructure Scoring Scale 
 
Source: Naval Support Acitivity Monterey Energy Office. (2015a). P852 v.21 eroi NSAM 
fy18 lighting ECIP_03-03-2015[unpublished Excel spreadsheet].  
4. Regulatory Compliance and Shareholder Expectations 
eROI measures regulatory compliance in accordance with the following 
mandates: 
• Energy Independence and Security Act (EISA) of 2007 
• Executive Order 13423 and 13514 
• Energy Policy Act of 2005 
• National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) of 2005 
The list is similar to the DOD standard list of mandates found in Table 1 of 
Chapter 1, with the exception of the NDAA. “As per the FY 2012 NDAA the DON has 
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an additional requirement to meter Navy piers to accurately measure the energy 
consumption of naval vessels in port” (Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense 
(Energy, Installations, and Environment), 2015). The shareholder’s expectation piece of 
this driver is addressed in questions 2–4. The Bloom Box was scored according to the 
following four questions as per the eROI methodology: 
1. Given the regulatory mandates above, Bloom Box complies with how 
many? We assess that Bloom Box complies with 2 mandates: the EISA 
since petroleum consumption is reduced and the EPA since the Bloom 
Box includes a meter to measure natural gas consumption. Bloom Box 
receives a score of 2 as per the scoring scale in Figure 16. 
Figure 16.  Regulatory Compliance Scoring Scale 
 
Source: Naval Support Acitivity Monterey Energy Office. (2015a). P852 v.21 eroi NSAM 
fy18 lighting ECIP_03-03-2015 [unpublished Excel spreadsheet].  
2. Public Perception: Will this project showcase to the public that the Navy is 
investing in renewable energy that will yield social policy benefits. We 
score the Bloom Box a 3 because the server is perceived as alternative 
energy and is advertised as a more eco-friendly generation solution as 
compared to the commercial grid. The scoring scale for this question is 
shown in Figure 17. 
Figure 17.  Public Perception Scoring Scale 
 
Source: Naval Support Acitivity Monterey Energy Office. (2015a). P852 v.21 eroi NSAM 
fy18 lighting ECIP_03-03-2015 [unpublished Excel spreadsheet].  
3. The Navy’s quality of service goals are: having a work environment that 
contributes to personal and professional growth, high job satisfaction, 
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ongoing professional growth, high-quality training, education, and 
personal recognition. How will this project impact the Navy’s quality of 
service goals? The Bloom Box scores a 1 in this category because quality 
of service will likely increase due to the elimination of commercial grid 
outages. The scoring scale is shown in Figure 18.  
Figure 18.  Quality of Service Scoring Scale 
 
Source: Naval Support Acitivity Monterey Energy Office. (2015a). P852 v.21 eroi NSAM 
fy18 lighting ECIP_03-03-2015 [unpublished Excel spreadsheet].  
4. The impact this project will have on quality of service will affect how 
many people in the Navy? Since the Bloom Box life span is ten years, it 
potentially impacts thousands of personnel that will use the Dudley Know 
Library over that time period. Bloom Box receives a 5 for this question. 
The scoring scale for this question is shown in Figure 19.  
Figure 19.  Quality of Service Affects Scoring Scale 
  
Source: Naval Support Acitivity Monterey Energy Office. (2015a). P852 v.21 eroi NSAM 
fy18 lighting ECIP_03-03-2015 [unpublished Excel spreadsheet].  
5. Develop Enabling Infrastructure 
The Develop Enabling Infrastructure driver refers to the Navy’s objective of 
developing infrastructure that will enable a comprehensive and reliable grid in the future. 
The following four questions used for scoring are purely subjective but assist in 
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collecting data regarding the project’s contribution toward a reliable energy 
infrastructure.  
1. How will this project impact the Navy’s data and information regarding 
energy demand and supply? Bloom Box scores a 3 for this question 
because the server provides significant new technology, information, and 
infrastructure. The scoring scale is shown in Figure 20. 
Figure 20.  Energy Demand and Supply Data Scoring Scale  
 
From Naval Support Acitivity Monterey Energy Office. (2015a). P852 v.21 eroi NSAM 
fy18 lighting ECIP_03-03-2015 [excel spreadsheet]. Department of Defense unpublished  
2. How will this project impact the development of a flexible energy 
infrastructure at Navy installations? Bloom Box receives a 2 for this 
question based on its ability to stabilize energy delivery and reduce 




Figure 21.  Flexible Energy Infrastructure Scoring Scale 
  
Source: Naval Support Acitivity Monterey Energy Office. (2015a). P852 v.21 eroi NSAM 
fy18 lighting ECIP_03-03-2015 [unpublished Excel spreadsheet].  
3. How will this project impact the Navy’s ability to demonstrate new energy 
technology adoption that enables energy independence? Since the Bloom 
Box installation is the first of its kind on a Navy installation, it scores a 3 
as the server promotes learning, validation of new technologies, and 
demonstrates a leading role among DOD organizations in alternative 
energy generation. The scoring scale is shown in Figure 22. 
Figure 22.  New Energy Technology Scoring Scale  
  
Source: Naval Support Acitivity Monterey Energy Office. (2015a). P852 v.21 eroi NSAM 
fy18 lighting ECIP_03-03-2015 [unpublished Excel spreadsheet].  
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4. This project will be applicable at what percentage of current, operating 
Navy installations? The Bloom Box is not operating on any other Navy 
installations and is therefore scored at a 0%. 
C. RESULTS  
A limitation of this project (discussed in detail in the last chapter) is the lack of a 
working copy of the eROI spreadsheet. Since “read only” copies were available for this 
project, an actual eROI score or B/C ratio is not available for the Bloom Box project. 
However, since the eROI tool places such a high value on the cost metrics, Bloom Box 
would receive a very low overall score due to the extremely poor NPV and the 37-year 
payback period. Bloom Box scored well on the “Develop Enabling Infrastructure” and 
“Minimize Shore Energy Consumption” drivers; however, because those drivers are 
weighted at just 9% and 13% respectively, the favorable scores do not leave the Bloom 
Box project in good standing due to the over valuation of the cost metrics. An alternative 
energy generation project such as Bloom Box provides the energy security and 
independence that Secretary Mabus said is necessary “for our installations to be able to 
sustain critical missions in the face of ever-rising uncertainty regarding their electrical 
power” (Department of the Navy, 2010). Yet, the Bloom Box, or any other project with a 
poor NPV would not be considered despite making innovative strides toward energy 
security and independence.  
D. BLOOM BOX EVALUATION UNDER NEW MODEL 
As explained earlier, the model developed for this project functions differently 
than eROI. Each energy category consists of attributes that receive a score from zero to 
five (or zero to one for the policy category). The following is a breakdown of how the 






Table 7.   Scoring Criteria and Metrics 
Score Risk Resiliency Cost Policy 













the project?  






































a. Natural Disasters 
NSAM is located on the Central California Coast where earthquake and tsunami 
disasters pose a realistic threat. Since earthquakes occur regularly throughout this region, 
the probability of occurrence is high but the most likely scenario is limited damage, if 
any. A primary risk from a natural disaster is disruption of natural gas delivery because 
the Bloom Box cannot function without a continuous supply. The Bloom Box is a more 
durable infrastructure than the commercial grid because it is smaller and can be installed 
on elevated ground with sufficient drainage to reduce the risk of outage from flooding or 
storm surge. Most commercial grids are large, and more prone to outage from high winds 
or flooding. Additionally, less electric wiring is required to run from the server to the 
library and the wiring that is necessary is underground so there is a reduced risk of 
damage from a disaster. Score: 3.5. 
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b. Terrorist Attack/Intelligent Adversary 
Since the Dudley Knox Library is not a mission critical facility, and this Bloom 
Box project powers just a single building, an attack is less likely than an attack on a large 
outstation that supplies critical power to a larger population. The Bloom Box is installed 
on a secure DOD installation, so security is significantly enhanced over the commercial 
grid since most outstations are located in remote areas with a minimal security presence. 
Therefore, access to the actual server is limited. Furthermore, the Bloom Box is 
essentially a “plug and play” server, so repairing a damaged unit takes much less time 
than repairing or replacing a damaged transformer (which can take months). Risk of a 
deliberate attack is significantly decreased with a Bloom Box installed. Score: 4.  
c. Commercial Grid Reliance 
For this project, the Bloom Box supplies 100% of the power to the Dudley Knox 
Library therefore, it is independent of the commercial grid. The server is not susceptible 
to grid overload or brownout/blackout. Both energy security and independence are 
enhanced due to reduced risk of commercial grid reliance. Score: 5. 
d. Fossil Fuel Consumption 
Though the Bloom Box can be powered with renewable energy such as solar or 
wind, for this project, it is 100% reliant on natural gas. Therefore, it is exposed to market 
price volatility associated with supply shortages and potential delivery issues. However, 
as noted earlier, the Bloom Box is almost twice as efficient operating off of natural gas as 
compared to the grid. Therefore, fossil fuel consumption sees a risk reduction. Score: 3.  
2. Resiliency 
a. Localized Generation 
The Bloom Box has the ability to generate power locally despite its reliance on a 
continuous natural gas supply and therefore, improves upon the alternative of relying on 
an off-site grid. This particular server is capable of providing 250kw of continuous power 
to the library, which has peak demand of 200kw. The result of a greater supply than peak 
demand is risk reduction and increased resiliency. The Bloom Box is capable of 
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providing power during weather conditions outside the norm, whereas a non-local 
generation site is more susceptible to outages. The localized generation ability of the 
Bloom Box significantly enhances resiliency over the grid. Score: 4. 
b. Conservation 
In theory, installing a Bloom Box has little to no effect on demand as it does not 
encourage energy reduction through decreased usage. However, because the Bloom Box 
consumes natural gas more efficiently than the grid and other generators, conservation is 
moderately improved. Score: 3. 
c. Priority Distribution 
As of the date of this project, Bloom Box servers do not have the ability to control 
which nodes receive power. For this project, the Bloom Box is powering a single building 
and does not have an option to re-route power. Score: 1. 
d. Storage Ability 
The Bloom Box does not have the capacity to store excess power nor a reserve 
fuel source. Installing the Bloom Box results in no change from the grid regarding energy 
storage. Score: 1. 
e. Repairability 
As mentioned earlier, repairing or replacing parts on the commercial grid can take 
months. Often, parts are manufactured as requested because demand is so low. While on-
site repair teams are unlikely for this project because Bloom Box is a commercial product 
installed on a DOD installation, repair parts are more readily available, which 
significantly reduces down time. Additionally, the Bloom Energy Company is 
incentivized to replace or repair parts as quickly as possible since it is an emerging 
technology that is seeking market approval and validation. The commercial grid is a state 
owned infrastructure and is not motivated in the same way as a private entity. Also, 
replacing parts is a one-for-one exchange so minimal maintenance time is required for 
repair. Score: 3.5. 
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f. Adaptability 
The Bloom Box is marketed as a flexible energy solution because of its ability to 
provide power using renewable sources or fossil fuels. This feature provides an 
installation with options, should the Bloom Box be re-purposed for another project in the 
future. Also, the server plugs right into existing infrastructure. Rewiring the library or 
changing fuse box and breaker locations is not necessary. The Bloom Box is a significant 
improvement over the adaptability capacity of the grid. Score: 4. 
3. Cost 
This model calculates the cost metric as a percentage of NPV/Total Project Cost. 
The NPV calculated for the Bloom Box is -$600,135 as identified under the Bloom Box 
evaluation using eROI earlier in the chapter. Expressed as a percentage of total project 
cost, Bloom Box yields a cost metric of -75% and thus earns a score of 0. See Appendix 
for calculations. 
4. Policy 
The policy category of this model is scored differently than the three previous 
categories. Rather than a zero to five scale, if the project supports the policy, the score is 
a one, zero otherwise. The Bloom Box is scored as follows: 
1. The Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007. Bloom Box supports 
this policy as the project reduces petroleum consumption. Score: 1. 
2. Energy Policy Act of 2005. Bloom Box supports this policy due to the 
local meter installed for on-site monitoring of consumption. Score: 1. 
3. Title 10 U.S.C. 2911(e). Bloom Box does not support this policy as this 
particular server does not utilize a renewable fuel source. Score: 0. 
4. Executive Order 13423. According to the Bloom Energy website, the 
server uses “no water during normal operation beyond a 240-gallon 
injection at start up.” A 250kw Bloom server could save up to 21.5 million 
gallons annually compared to the commercial grid (Bloom Energy). 
Therefore, the Bloom Box supports this order and receives a score: 1. 
5. DON initiative to increase alternative energy ashore. Bloom Box supports 
this mandate since it is an alternative energy generation project. Score: 1. 
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E. RESULTS 
The result of the Bloom Box evaluation using the new model is a score of 53.2% 
out of a maximum score of 100% as show in Figure 23. While this may seem like a poor 
score, standards for comparison do not yet exist. Bloom Box scored well in the policy, risk, 
and resiliency categories, but poorly according to the cost metrics. However, since each 
category is weighted equally, cost does not account for the majority of the model as with 
eROI. The project scored well because the model does not favor one category over another.  
Figure 23.  Bloom Box Results 
  
 
The flexibility of this model allows energy planners to adjust category weights to 
experiment with outcomes. For example, a fiscally constrained environment may dictate 
that cost metrics will carry the majority of the weight in the model. Conversely, risk and 
resiliency receive stronger consideration and carry higher value when a project is located 
in a high-risk environment. Since the risk and resilience metrics are subjective, the 
category weights should be modified in an experimental fashion in order to see how 
outcomes and project selection might change with perceived value. For example, Figure 
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24 shows the same Bloom Box project evaluated with different category weights and 
thus, a different final score.  
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Figure 24.  Modified Bloom Box Results 
 
 
With risk and resilience now weighted at 35% each, and cost and policy at 15% 
each, the total project score increases by over 5%. This may not seem like a significant 
difference but the purpose of manipulating the model is not to produce a more favorable 
or preferred outcome, but to make energy planners realize that risk and resiliency are 
important factors to consider when making energy investments. When the categories are 
perceived to have more value, they will affect the outcome of energy project 
prioritization and selection. 
F. COMPARISON OF THE BLOOM BOX UNDER THE TWO DIFFERENT 
MODELS 
While the two models evaluate many of the same metrics and factors, their 
outcomes are different. Under eROI, financial metrics dominate with a 39% value and as 
a result, the Bloom Box scores poorly because of the significant initial capital required to 
purchase the server and the considerably long payback period of over 37 years. Under the 
new model, financial metrics are perceived to have a more equivalent value to risk and 
resiliency. Predictably, the Bloom Box project receives better scores with all categories 
on an equal playing field. Under eROI, Bloom Box would receive a very low B/C ratio 
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placing it at the bottom of the priority list and may never receive any funding. However, 
when evaluated under the new model, energy planners realize that the Bloom Box 





We experienced a number of limitations regarding the development of the new 
model and the analysis of eROI. The first limitation is a small sample size of data. For the 
cost category or our model, we developed a scoring scale using the NPV’s of three past 
NSAM energy projects. A sample size of just three projects is not enough data to 
determine a realistic range, mean, or standard deviation of  net present values. In FY 
2014, the Navy evaluated at least 169 energy projects using eROI. Ideally, the data to 
validate a model includes as many past energy projects as possible, but a sufficient 
sample size of that population is at least 10% or 17 projects. 
Another limitation is a working copy of the eROI spreadsheet. In order to evaluate 
the Bloom Box effectively using the eROI tool, we needed to input Bloom Box data into 
a working spreadsheet. Since we only had access to a “read only” version, we were 
unable to obtain an actual eROI score or B/C ratio and as a result, our assessment of the 
Bloom Box was based largely off of assumptions and subjective interpretations of the 
eROI questions.  
eROI is further limited because we do not know how the B/C score is actually 
calculated. The questions and required data is visible on each tab of the spreadsheet but 
the actual calculations are hidden. Understanding the eROI scoring process will allow the 
user to obtain a score even with a “read only” version of the tool. 
A goal for this project was to develop a method to quantify intangible factors 
related to energy risk and resiliency. Though that goal was attained through employing a 
Likert scoring scale, a potential constraint of the model is the subjective inputs for the 
risk and resiliency categories. Unlike the other two energy categories of cost and policy, 
risk and resiliency is scored using mostly qualitative data and is therefore open to 
interpretation. Consequently, a single project or a range of projects may receive a wide 
variation of results depending on the user’s perceived value of risk and resiliency and 
their interpretation of the category attributes.  
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Furthermore, the adjustment of the category percentages allows the user to 
manipulate the model to yield a favorable outcome. We view the flexibility of the model 
as a positive aspect, though the user can easily devalue risk and resiliency while 
increasing the value of the cost and policy categories to produce the preferred outcome. 
Finally, the model is currently limited due to its lack of validation. Since it is 
brand new and has been tested just one time for the research of this project using a small 
sample size, the model lacks fidelity and should be tested further to gain traction.  
B. FURTHER RESEARCH 
Further research is necessary to validate the model since it is newly developed 
and has been tested using only a theoretical project. The result of the Bloom Box 
evaluation conducted for this project is limited because the only alternative to compare 
the project against is the commercial grid. Ideally, a project should have two or more 
alternatives to allow for an equivalent comparison. Follow-on research should be focused 
on collecting relevant and current data on energy generation projects to be evaluated 
using the new model. Obtaining information on projects specific to energy generation is 
important because many energy projects have a negligible effect on risk and resiliency 
and therefore, would not be suitable to validate the model. For example, information on 
small-scale projects such as LED light bulb conversion or HVAC improvements is 
accessible but neither of those projects have an impact on risk or resiliency. If those 
projects were evaluated under the new model, the output would have little value as 
compared to an eROI evaluation. The new model is most valuable when evaluating 
projects that can significantly impact risk and resiliency such as alternative/renewable 
energy generation. We recommend follow-on research to incorporate such projects to 
further validate the new model. We hypothesize that the metrics and category attributes 
will need adjustments as the model gains fidelity. 
Another research opportunity exists to test the model beyond the scope of 
individual energy projects. Energy planners and Commanders at Naval shore installations 
need a tool to evaluate their entire energy infrastructure. eROI falls short in fulfilling that 
requirement because it is specifically designed to evaluate a single project at a time. The 
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new model can be adapted to assess a complete energy infrastructure at an installation. 
For example, if the energy planners for NSAM wanted information on the efficiencies 
and shortfalls of the energy infrastructure at the Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, 
the new model can accomplish that by interpreting the data collectively. The output of 
such an evaluation allows planners to identify where the installation is meeting 
requirements and falling short of energy mandates, which ultimately allows for efficient 
allocation of funding and other resources. 
C. SUMMARY 
Today’s energy investment process lacks the inclusion of risk and resiliency 
factors necessary to provide energy security and independence. While cost metrics such 
as NPV cannot be ignored as the DOD adjusts to constrained budgets, the over reliance 
on an unstable commercial grid leaves shore installations with too much risk. The 
question for energy planners and leaders is, “What is an acceptable level of risk?” Since 
current energy decisions are not inclusive of a full scope of risk, that question remains 
unanswered. If cost must remain the primary consideration moving forward then the 
question becomes, “How much cost savings must a project generate to accept a higher 
level of risk and lower level of resiliency?” 
The implied objective of the model is not necessarily to show that considering the 
full scope of risk and resiliency will always lead to a different decision, but rather to 
illustrate that under certain conditions the outcome will be different. As explained in the 
Data Analysis chapter, a project scores differently when the perceived value of cost, risk, 
resiliency, and policy vary. 
The Navy perceives eROI as a comprehensive tool for energy investments, but as 
this project has shown, the model omits important factors of risk and resiliency, thus 
exposing shore installations to increased risk. Today, energy security is at the mercy of 
the national power grid. Partially to blame for this flaw is an over emphasis on cost 
metrics and an undervaluation of risk and resiliency. The model developed for this 
project improves upon the status quo and places the Navy closer to Secretary Mabus’ 
goals of energy security and independence.  
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APPENDIX. NPV CALCULATION 
 
Adapted from: United States Energy Information Administration. (2015, October 30). California natural gas industrial price [graphical 
data].Retrieved from http://www.eia.gov/dnav/ng/hist/n3035ca3m.htm; Patil, V., & Chindhi, P. (n.d.). Bloom Energy technology. IOSR 
Journal of Electronics and Communication Engineering, 6(66), pp 1–6. Retrieved from http://iosrjournals.org/iosr-jece/papers/sicete-
volume6/66.pdf; Bassett, G., England, A., Li, F., Weinberger, J., & Wong, A. (n.d.) The science and economics of the bloom box: Their use as 
a source of energy in California. Retrieved November 15, 2015, from http://franke.uchicago.edu/bigproblems/Team4-1210.pdf; Adams, A., 
Chowdhary, A., & Subbaiah, V. (2011). Cost analysis comparison of bloom energy fuel cells with solar energy technology and traditional 
electric companies. Retrieved November 10, 2015, from http://generalengineering.sjsu.edu/docs/pdf/mse_prj_rpts/spring2011/Cost 
%20Analysis%20Comparison%20of%20Bloom%20Energy%20Fuel%20Cells.pdf 
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Cash/Inflows
fuel/savings/(@.045) 23,400$//////////// 23,400$//////////// 23,400$////////////////// 23,400$///////////////// 23,400$///////// 23,400$///////// 23,400$///////// 23,400$///////// 23,400$///////// 23,400$/////////
?$/////////////////// 23,400$//////////// 23,400$//////////// 23,400$////////////////// 23,400$///////////////// 23,400$///////// 23,400$///////// 23,400$///////// 23,400$///////// 23,400$///////// 23,400$/////////
Net/Cash/flows 800,000?$///////// 20,422$//////////// 20,422$//////////// 20,422$////////////////// 20,422$///////////////// 20,422$///////// 20,422$///////// 20,422$///////// 20,422$///////// 20,422$///////// 20,422$/////////
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